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I. INTRODUCTION
The medical problems associated with smoking in the
United States have reached epidemic proportions.! Cigarettes
are the nation's leading preventable cause of death and have
given rise to the "most important public health issue of our
time."2 Despite the serious health risks inherent in smoking,
however, it is on the rise among the nation's young people.
This increase is largely attributed to advertising, which has
been an effective means for the tobacco industry to maintain
its customer base and to recruit new smokers. Because of
. J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Pennsylvania; M.S.E. 1997. University of
Pennsylvania; B.S.E. 1996. Duke University. This Comment is dedicated to my par-
ents, Lou and Barbara Virelli. and to my brother. Chris VirellI. for their unending
love and support. Special thanks to Professors Seth Krelmer and Frank Goodman
for their insightful comments. Mary Sigler and all the editors of the Journal of Const-
tutional Law for their hard work and dedication, and to Andrew Morton for his as-
sistance in bringing this issue to my attention. "[Eiverything led] up to this day. and
it's just like any other day that's ever been." GRATEFUL DEAD. Black Peter, on
WoRKINGM N's DEAD (Warner Bros. Records Inc. 1970).
1 See Lawrence 0. Gostln & Allan M. Brandt. Criteriafor Evaluating a Ban on the
Advertisement of Cigarettes, 269 JAMA 904. 905 ([The state has a compelling inter-
est in trying to reduce smoking.").
2 Gilbert J. Botvin et al.. Smoking Behavior of Adolescents Exposed to Cigarette
Advertising, 108 PUB. HEALTH REP. 217. 217 (1993) (citation omitted).3 See John P. Pierce et al., Tobacco Industry Promotion of Cigarettes and Adoles-
cent Smoking, 279 JAMA 511, 514 (1998) (Mobacco promotional activities influ-
enced 54,454... adolescents (or 17% of the total population of this age) to experi-
ment with cigarettes before they reached the age of 18 years.); John Schwartz.
Smoking Rises Among College Students, PHILA. INQUIRER. Nov. 18, 1998. at AS (stat-
ing that the number of college students who smoke grew by 28 percent between
1993 and 1997, with younger students being more likely to begin smoking than
older ones).
4 See Botvin et al., supra note 2. at 218 (Cigarettes are the most heavily pro-
moted product in the country.*): (d. at 221 ("[Rlesults indicate that exposure to ciga-
rette advertising is significantly correlated with reported smoking behavior.): td. at
223 ("[Evidence ... suggests that there may be a causal relationship between ciga-
rette advertising and smoking initiation.").
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their power to promote smoking, tobacco ads provide an op-
portunity for the government to effectively combat this na-
tional health epidemic.
The Internal Revenue Code allows companies to deduct all
of their advertising costs as business expenses.' This provi-
sion is particularly beneficial to tobacco companies, who in
1998 spent $4.6 billion on advertising.6 In order to mitigate
the detrimental effects of tobacco ads, the Harkin Amend-
ment-which decreased permissible deductions for tobacco
ads to 50% of their total cost- was introduced in the Senate
in 1993.8 Because the Harkin Amendment was defeated,
however, its constitutionality was never formally examined.
In 2000, Congress is again considering a limitation on the
tax deductible status of tobacco advertisements, this time in
the form of a complete removal of such status (hereinafter
"Proposal").9 Despite the recent settlement of forty-six states'
claims against the tobacco industry, lawmakers continue to
stress the importance of adopting federal anti-smoking legis-
lation.' ° Indeed, the states' success in forcing tobacco com-
5 See I.R.C. § 162 (1993) (allowing tobacco companies to deduct from their gross
income the cost of tobacco advertising and promotional expenses).6 See Diane E. Stover, Women, Smoking, and Lung Cancer, CHEST, Jan. 1998, at I
("Presently, the tobacco industry spends $4.6 billion yearly (that Is, $12.6 million a
day) on tobacco advertising.").
See 139th CONG. REC. S. 3052-54 (daly ed. Mar. 17, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Harkin). Harkin noted:
The amount allowable as a deduction under this chapter for expenses relating
to advertising or promoting cigars, cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, pipe tobacco,
or any similar tobacco product shall not exceed 50 percent of the amount of
such expenses which would (but for this section) be allowable as a deduction
under this chapter.
Id.8 See S. Res. 609, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Sally L. Venverloh, Note, The
Harkin Amendment. The Constitutionality of Limiting Deductions for Tobacco Adver-
tising, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 787 (1994). The Harkin Amendment was just one
step in a series of anti-tobacco legislation spanning the previous three decades. For
example, in 1965, Congress passed legislation mandating warning labels on tobacco
product packages. See MICHAEL G. GARrNER, ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
27 (1989). This was followed by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (15
U.S.C. § 1335), which changed the wording of warning labels and banned all ciga-
rette advertisements from electronic media. See Id. In 1984, Congress required that
warnings appear in tobacco advertisements, and in 1986 It extended label require-
ments and the ban against electronic advertisements to smokeless tobacco. See
RicHARD T. KAPLAR, ADVERTISING RIGHTS: THE NEGLECTED FREEDOM 11-12 (1991). Fi-
nally, Congress passed the Smoking Prevention Health and Education Act in 1988 as
codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1333, which "strengthened the tone of warning labels and
made them fifty percent larger than before." See Venverloh, supra, at 801.
9 See Henry Cohen, CRS Report for Congress: Tobacco Advertising: The Con-stitutionality of Limiting its Tax Deductibility, (Cong. Research Serv. Doc. 98-189A)
(1998).
10 See Barry Meier, Remaining States Approve the Pact on Tobacco Suits, N.Y.
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panies to assume financial responsibility for tobacco-related
health problems has fostered a political climate more condu-
cive to such legislation. Congress' Proposal is a timely effort
to build on the modest but significant achievement of the re-
cent tobacco settlement and to curb tobacco use in the
United States through federal regulation.
On November 20, 1998, forty-six states accepted a settle-
ment agreement with four of the nation's five largest tobacco
companies." The settlement prevents the states from bring-
ing suit to recover Medicaid money spent treating smoking-
related illnesses and grants the states a total of $206 billion
over the next twenty-five years. 12 The settlement eliminates
tobacco advertisements on billboards and mass transit, and
limits tobacco companies to one brand-name sponsorship per
year, provided the event "does not involve a sports team, have
paid participants who are underage or cater to a young audi-
ence.""3 The settlement also requires tobacco companies to
contribute $1.45 billion over the next five years to national
anti-smoking campaigns. 14 The deal does not, however, limit
print, in-store, or combination advertising,'
5 and was de-
scribed as weak by former Surgeon General Dr. C. Everett
Koop. 16 Many opponents of the settlement, including former
Food and Drug Administration commissioner David Kessler,
have criticized the agreement for being too lenient on the to-
bacco industry." In addition to some of the settlement's sub-
TIMES, Nov. 21. 1998, at Al.
,1 See idt. The four companies involved in the settlement were R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco, Lorillard Tobacco. Brown & Williamson Tobacco. and Uggett & Myers. See tc.
Every state except Massachusetts also agreed to a settlement with U.S. Tobacco. a
maker of smokeless tobacco products. See teL
12 See iL
13 Stephanie Stapleton. Tobacco Deal Doesn't Settle All the Issues. AM. IED. NE%,S.
Dec. 7. 1998. at 6.
14 See Gal Gibson, Tobacco Settlement: It's Unanimous. PIlA. INQUIRER Nov. 21.
1998, at Al. It should be noted that the industry currently spends roughly $6 bil-
lion annually on advertising and marketing. The $1.45 billion contribution over five
years and four companies to anti-smoking campaigns is a relatively Insignificant part
of each company's budget. See A Weak Tobacco Deal. N.Y. TimES. Nov. 17. 1998. at
A24 ("Tobacco companies would have no trouble shifting the nearly S6 billion a year
they spend on marketing to formats that are not prohibited.).
Combination ads are defined here as ads in which an impermissible ad Is in-
cluded as part of an otherwise permissible advertisement. For exmple. a billboard
for a convenience store that featured a sale price on cigarettes is herein considered a
combination ad. The effect of the settlement on such advertisements will inevitably
be a controversial matter of interpretation, and therefore is arguably a shortcoming
of the agreement
16 See Meier, supra note 10. at Al.
17 See No Dea: Behind-the-Scenes Tobacco Settlement Falls Short. Get Congress
and the PresidentBack Into the Act, PHILuA INQUIRER, Nov. 18. 1998. at A22 ('There is
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stantive inadequacies, many of its critics are also concerned
that its presence will deter what they consider to be badly
needed federal legislative treatment of the tobacco epidemic.
President Clinton noted that "only the national government
can take the full range of steps needed to protect our children
from the dangers of tobacco." 9
In light of the building consensus concerning the need for
strong federal anti-smoking initiatives, the question of
whether and to what degree the First Amendment permits the
federal government to legislate against tobacco advertising
becomes more important. As the number of young American
smokers continues to increase, the call for federal legislation
limiting tobacco is likely to grow stronger. The constitution-
ality of restrictions on advertising and other forms of tobacco-
related commercial speech are bound to come to the forefront
of First Amendment jurisprudence.2
Although critics of the Proposal maintain that it violates
tobacco companies' right to free speech, this Comment argues
that Congress' Proposal to remove tax deductible status from
tobacco advertisements is an effective, constitutional means
of combating a dangerous national epidemic.
Tobacco companies and their supporters object to Con-
gress' Proposal on the ground that it violates the companies'
First Amendment right to freedom of speech.22 Specifically,
very little here for public health. There are more tobacco industry loopholes than
you can imagine.'" (quoting David Kessler)); Saundra Torry, More States, White House
Endorse Tobacco Deal, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1998, at Al (quoting Connecticut Attor-
ney General Richard Blumenthal, who said "the industry has shown it Is extraordi-
narily skilled at exploiting loopholes... in laws and agreements").
18 See Gal Gibson & Raja Mishra, More States Prodded on Tobacco Deal, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Nov. 17, 1998, at Al (quoting Colorado Attorney General Gale Norton pre-
dicting that attorneys general all over the country will push for future accomplish-
ments"); Stapleton, supra note 13, at 6 ("[Attorneys general] acknowledged [the set-
tlement] is, at best, a single chapter in the tobacco-control movement and in no way
diminishes the need for comprehensive legislation.").
19 Gibson & Mishra, supra note 18, at Al. In addition to the President, Matthew
Myers, executive vice president for the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, stated that
"if Congress uses this agreement as an excuse not to enact tobacco legislation this
coming year, it'l be a tragedy." Stapleton, supra note 20, at 6.
20 See Schwartz, supra note 3. at A8 (noting increase in the number of young
American smokers).
21 The Supreme Court recently struck down 18 U.S.C. § 1304 as unconstitutional
under the First Amendment. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States,
119 S. Ct. 863 (1999). Section 1304 forbids certain broadcast advertisements for
gambling establishments. The grant of certiorari and decision in this case Is evi-
dence of the Court's continued interest in commercial speech Issues. Recent devcl-
opments in national anti-tobacco policy will likely act in conjunction with decisions
like Greater New Orleans Broadcasting to bring the relationship of advertising and
the First Amendment into the foreground of American constitutional law.
22 See Memorandum from Jim Davidson for the Advertising Tax Coalition to the
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opponents claim that the Proposal is unconstitutional in two
ways. First, they maintain that it violates the First Amend-
ment's protection of commercial speech that has "evolved over
the past quarter century."23 Second, they claim that the Pro-
posal fails to provide this speech with the "protection from
government taxation or repulation" that they insist is integral
to free speech principles. Proponents of the Proposal, how-
ever, contend that the restriction will be an effective means of
curtailing tobacco advertisements and will therefore help re-
duce smoking.25 They insist that the removal of tax deducti-
bility is constitutional because it satisfies the Court's test for
evaluating regulations of commercial speech' and because it
is a constitutionally permissible use of the government's tax-
ing power to burden such speech.27
This Comment evaluates Congress' Proposal in light of this
constitutional debate. Part II traces the development of
commercial speech doctrine, outlining the current state of the
doctrine as it pertains to advertisements, particularly those
for tobacco products. Part IlI evaluates Congress' Proposal in
light of modem commercial speech doctrine and demon-
strates that the Proposal does not violate the controlling test
for commercial speech regulation established in Central Hud-
son Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.2 More
specifically, this Part addresses the Proposal's constitutional-
ity with respect to two different "substantial government in-
terests" and determines that the government interest in re-
ducing smoking does not pass the Central Hudson test as
clearly as an expressive government interest in condemning
the tobacco industry's irresponsible business practices. Part
IV considers taxation under the First Amendment, concluding
that the current Proposal is not restricted by either free
speech principles or Supreme Court precedent prohibiting the
Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman. House Judiciary Committee 1 (May 26. 1998
(on file with University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law) [hereinafter
Memorandum]. The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that -Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech. or of the press. . . . U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
Memorandum, supra note 22, at 1.2 4
1d.
25 See Cohen, supra note 9. at 5.
See &d. at 3-5.
Proponents cite Cammarano v. United States. 358 U.S. 498 (1959). and Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Wash.. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). to support their argu-
ment that reapplying tax liability to tobacco advertisements Is not invidious content
discrimination against speech and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny. See
Cohen, supra note 9. at 1-3.
28 447 U.S. 557. 569-70 (1980).
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taxation of speech. Congress' Proposal represents a creative
and constitutionally permissible device for diluting the to-
bacco industry's most effective means of promoting its prod-
ucts. It should therefore be upheld as a constitutionally
permissible regulation of commercial speech and an appro-
priate use of Congress' taxing power.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
The nation's Founders considered free speech a critical
and defining characteristic of the new government, as evi-
denced in the First Amendment to the Constitution, which
states that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech ... ."2 Since the adoption of the First
Amendment, philosophers have echoed the Founders' senti-
ment that the freedom to express one's views and engage in
open political and social debate is a cornerstone of American
democracy. 0
A. The History of Commercial Speech in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has established varying degrees of
protection for different categories of speech. Political speech,
for example, has been afforded the strongest First Amend-
ment protection, while other forms of speech, including com-
29 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERIY 75 (Gertrude Hlmmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1982 (1859)) ("No argument... can now be needed against permitting a leg-
Islature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opin-
ions to them and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed
to hear."). In his legendary dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919),
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued:
[Wihen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired Is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth Is the power of the thought to get Itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market, and that truth Is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate Is the the-
ory of our Constitution.
Id. at 630; see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITCAL FREEDOM 26 (1965) ("As the
self-governing community seeks, by method of voting, to gain wisdom in action, It
can find it only in the minds of its individual citizens. If they fall, it fails. That Is
why freedom of discussion for those minds may not be abridged."). Some modern
constitutional scholars have even advocated expanding the right of free speech to
promote a goal of social equality. See R. GEORGE WRIGHT, SELLING WORDS: FREE
SPEECH IN A COMMERCIAL CULTURE 16 (1997) ("Our best understanding of freedom of
speech may emphasize... the need to protect the speech of the outcast and the
relatively powerless."). This expansive view further demonstrates the degree of influ-
ence and authority afforded the principle of free speech in American government.
See id. at 35-36.
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mercial speech, have been denied such protectionY' After
initially denying First Amendment protection to commercial
speech, however, the Court later distinguished forms of
speech that were not wholly commercial in naturem ulti-
mately recognizing that even purely commercial speech mer-
its some First Amendment protection.33 In Central Hudson.
the Court developed a four-part test that remains the con-
trolling standard for determining the constitutionality of
commercial speech regulations.' The validity of Congress'
proposed removal of tax deductibility from tobacco ads de-
pends on its surviving the Central Hudson test, an analysis
that first requires an understanding of the development of
modem commercial speech doctrine.
1. Commercial Versus Noncommercial Speech
The justification and scope of commercial speech doctrine
depend on the validity of the distinction between commercial
and noncommercial speech. As an initial matter, the text of
the First Amendment does not distinguish between the two
forms of expression, indicating that the Framers did not con-
sider them separately. 5 Critics of commercial speech doc-
trine have accordingly characterized the Court's eventual dis-
tinction as "an artificial one,"36 arguing that First Amendment
protection should be granted equally to commercial and non-
commercial speech.37
31 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942). Obscenity. libel and
slander, and incitement to violence all fall outside the realm or First Amendment
protection. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S. 323. 343 (1974) (libel and
slander); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444. 447 (1969) (incitement to violence):
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957) (obscenity). But see R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386, 392 (1992) (limiting regulations against 'fighting words"
to those that are facially neutral).
32 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 266 (1964) (holding that
paid nature of publication does not render it -commercial').
33 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council. 425 U.S.
748, 765 (1976) (discussing the value of commercial speech).
34 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 447 U.S. 557.
566 (1980).
35 See, e.g., MICHAEL G. GARrNER, ADVERTISING AND THE FIRSr AENDIEWT 8 (1989)
("Our framers understood that it makes no difference from the standpoint of free
speech and self-government whether information appears in a news column or in a
paid advertisement.") (internal quotation marks omitted): see also Brian J. Waters.
Comment, A Doctrine in Disarray: Why the First Amendment Demands the Abandon-
ment of the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech 27 SETON HALL L REV. 1626.
1647 (1997) ('[Mhere is little evidence to suggest that commercial speech was singled
out [by the Framers] for separate treatment under the First Amendment.").
Waters, supra note 35. at 1647.
37See 44 Liquormart. Inc. v. Rhode Island. 517 U.S. 484. 523 n.4 (Thomas, J..
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Despite the absence of a textual distinction between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech, the historical circum-
stances surrounding the adoption of the First Amendment
indicate that commercial speech was not the focus of the
Framers' concern. In light of Madison's observation that the
First Amendment is "the essential difference between the
British Government and the American Constitutions,"" the
Amendment seems to reflect the Colonists' adverse reaction
to their lack of political influence over Britain before the
Revolution, suggesting that the amendment's primary pur-
pose was to protect an individual's freedom to engage in open
political discourse.3 9 According to Alexander Meiklejohn, "[als
the self-governing community seeks, by method of voting, to
gain wisdom in action, it can find it only in the minds of its
individual citizens .... That is why freedom of discussion for
those minds may not be abridged."4 0 Note that both of these
commentaries focus solely on the protection of political
speech. In the absence of evidence that the Framers also
considered commercial speech, there is little historical basis
for reading the First Amendment to include commercial
speech protection.
In addition to the historical argument, there is also a
practical distinction between commercial and noncommercial,
or political, speech.4' An individual's right to conduct busi-
ness as he or she pleases has long been a source of legislative
42restrictions. Moreover, there are different social costs asso-
ciated with the regulation of commercial and noncommercial
speech: governmental restrictions on political speech are
potentially more dangerous to the national welfare and iden-
concurring).
4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 72 (Jonathan Elliot ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1996)
(1891)
39 See EDwIN ROME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL FREE
SPEECH 36 (1985) ("Free speech is essential.., to... decision maldng in a demo-
cratic system.").
40 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 30, at 26.
41 See WRIGHT, supra note 30, at 57 ("We should not be as distrustful of govern-
ment's ability to regulate reasonably all commercial speech as of its ability to regu-
late fairly the speech of the government's own rival political parties, political move-
ments, and political ideologies."); see also Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and
the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 606 (1996) ("One could argue, however,
that governmental motivation for suppression Is considerably more suspect whcn
political speech is suppressed . . . .").
42 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937) (upholding
a state minimum wage law and inaugurating the era of judicial deference regarding
economic policy making).
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tity than are limitations on commercial speech.' These dif-
ferences support evaluating government regulations of com-
mercial and noncommercial speech differently.
Finally, Martin Redish has offered a three-part justification
that combines elements of various justificatory theories for
the differential protection of commercial and noncommercial
speech.' Redish maintains that commercial speech regula-
tion is less problematic with respect to First Amendment
principles because (1) "commercial speech does not foster
First Amendment values in the same manner as do more tra-
ditional categories of expression;" (2) "commercial speech
gives rise to regulatory problems not presented by other types
of expression;" and (3) "commercial speech is less vulnerable
to improper or abusive regulatory pressures than are other
forms of expression."5 Redish's third point captures the
Court's reasoning in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens' Consumer Council,46 where the Court distin-
guished commercial speech as hardier than noncommercial
speech and therefore better able to withstand government
regulation.47 These historical, practical, and precedential
justifications for treating commercial and noncommercial
speech differently are reflected in modem commercial speech
doctrine.4
2. Is Commercial Speech Worthy
of First Amendment Protection?
Since determining that commercial speech is distinct from
noncommercial speech, the Court has struggled to identify an
appropriate constitutional standard for evaluating commer-
cial speech regulations. Initially, the Court provided no con-
stitutional protection whatsoever for commercial speech. In
Valentine v. Chrestensen,49 a submarine owner distributed
4See Steven M. Cohen, Note, A Tax on Advertising: First Amendment and Com-
merce Clause Implications, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 810. 814-15 n.32 (1988) (Mhe incen-
tives and the resources to correct a commercial falsehood may not be as great as the
motivation to counter a political falsehood.").
44 See Redish, supra note 41. at 594.
45 Id.
4425 U.S. 748 (1976).
47 See d. at 771-72 n.24 (I[The greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial
speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of si-
lencing the speaker.").
4See generally ic.; Central Hudson Gas & Eec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n.
447 U.S. 557 (1980) (establishing a test for assessing the constitutionality of com-
mercial speech regulations).
49 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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advertising fliers in violation of a sanitation code ordinance
prohibiting public dissemination of commercial handbills.
Although the opposite side of the fliers contained a noncom-
mercial protest statement against the New York City Dock
Department, the Court denied the advertisements First
Amendment protection because it determined that the only
reason for the inclusion of the political speech was to circum-
vent the ordinance. ° In denying First Amendment protection
for the handbills, the Court focused not on the expressive in-
terests of the speaker, as in cases involving political speech,
but on the value of the information to its intended audience.51
This focus is consistent throughout the Court's development
of its commercial speech doctrine and distinguishes it from
standard First Amendment analysis.
The importance of commercial speech's value to its audi-
ence was emphasized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,52 a
case in which the City Commissioner of Montgomery, Ala-
bama claimed that he had been libeled by an advertisement
in the New York Times. The Court held that the advertise-
ment, which was primarily political in content, was noncom-
mercial, despite the fact that it had been purchased from the
Tines. 4 The Court protected the ad without specifically over-
ruling Valentine, focusing on the value of the political content
of the advertisement- which was sufficient to justify pro-
tecting the speech under the First Amendment- rather than
on the commercial content of the speech.'
50 See id. at 55 (finding that the "Constitution imposes no such [First Amendment]
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising... [because] the
affixing of the protest against official conduct to the advertising circular was with the
intent, and for the purpose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance").
51 See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Con-
stitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 779 (1999)
("[J]ustification for the [First Amendment] protection is based not on the expressive
liberty of the speaker, but on the importance of the information to the audience.").
52 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
M See id. at 256.
rA See id. at 266 ("[fIf the allegedly libelous statements would otherwise be con-
stitutionally protected from the present judgment, they do not forfeit that protection
because they were published in the form of a paid advertisement."). The Court later
narrowed slightly its position in New York Times when it ruled that paid ads pro-
moting illegal commercial activity are not protected by the First Amendment. See
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973). The Pittsburgh Press ruling can be distinguished from New York Times be-
cause it focused on the commercial content of the advertisement, not simply the fact
that it had been paid for, to characterize the speech as commercial for purposes of
the First Amendment.
55 See New York Times, 376 U.S at 266; see also Halberstam, supra note 51, at
780 (interpreting the holding of New York Times to mean that "commercial speech
would be protected as long as there was sufficient interest in Its content").
[Vol. 2:2
Mar. 20001 PERMISSIBLE BURDEN OR CONSTITTIONAL WOLATION? 539
The Court first extended First Amendment protection to
purely commercial speech in Bigelow v. Virginia.5 In analyz-
ing an ad for abortions, the Court justified some constitu-
tional protection for commercial speech, determining that
"[tihe relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or
of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of
ideas."57 Speciflcally, the Court focused on the value of the
information in the advertisement and determined that it was
worthy of First Amendment protection despite Its commercial
qualities. 5' Bigelow did not, however, explicitly overrule Val-
entine.5 9 The Court instead distinguished Valentine and jus-
tified protecting commercial speech on the grounds that the
audience had a right to the specific information in the adver-
tisement.
3. Commercial Speech Is Worthy
of First Amendment Protection
A year after Bigelow, the Court in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy recognized a common-sense difference between
commercial and noncommercial speech and adapted its
holding in Valentine, stating that "in some circumstances
speech of an entirely private and economic character enjoys
the protection of the First Amendment."6' The Court granted
commercial speech some constitutional protection because it
determined that the listener has a First Amendment right to
receive commercial as well as political information;6 it re-
56 421 U.S. 809 (1975); see also Halberstam. supra note 51. at 781 (1999) (stating
that Bigelow was 'the first time the Court held that a legislative prohibition on com-
mercial speech violated the First Amendment").
57 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826.
58 See id. at 829; see also Halberstam. supra note 51. at 781 Tmhe Court held
that the valuable opinion and information accompanying th[e] proposal in Bigelow
were entitled to First Amendment protection.").
59 Compare Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822 (holding that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it restricted speech that did more than propose a commercial trans-
action), with Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52. 54 (1942) (holding that the First
Amendment does not protect "purely commercial advertising).
See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. 425
U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976).
61 Id. at 763 n.17.
See id. at 763-64 (stating that society may have a strong interest in the dis-
semination of commercial information); see also Keindenst v. Mandel. 408 U.S. 753.
762-63 (1972) (emphasizing the listener's right to hear as an important part of First
Amendment analysis). The listener's interest in protecting commercial speech is the
only justifiable grounds for the Court's decision in Virgirnla Pharmacy because other
defensible motivations for protecting speech, such as political utility and personal
dignity, are not threatened by commercial speech restrictions. See KAPLAR. supra
note 8. at 55.
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tained the distinction between commercial and noncommer-
cial speech, however, determining that commercial speech is
more objective and durable than noncommercial speech and
is therefore less likely to be silenced by regulation.'
After Virginia Board, the Court used the distinction be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech to deny com-
mercial speech First Amendment protection in a variety of
contexts. Recognizing that commercial speech is incidental to
commercial activity, the Court determined that, since com-
mercial activity is subject to regulation, commercial speech
should likewise be subject to governmental restrictions.' The
Court did not, however, entirely abandon consideration of the
value of commercial speech to its audience. In Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 6 the Court struck down as overbroad a re-
striction on attorney advertising, despite findings that the ad-
vertising at issue was inherently misleading,' because the
value of the information to the consumer was seen to out-
weigh the potential social damage from misleading advertis-
ing.
Although by 1979 the Court had established that commer-
cial speech was generally worthy of at least some First
Amendment protection, it was unable to establish clear and
consistent standards for determining when and to what ex-
tent protection should be granted. The uncertainty of these
standards led to the development of the four-part test articu-
lated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission9 to determine the constitutionality of commercial
speech regulations.
4. The Central Hudson Test
In Central Hudson, the Court struck down a statute pro-
hibiting advertising and other promotional activities designed
See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979) ("[Clommercial speech is
linked inextricably to commercial activity .... ).
See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (recognizing
the "distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in
an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of
speech").
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
67 See Id.
See id. at 381-82; see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437 (1963) (holding
that Virginia's limitation on attorney solicitation violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments).
69 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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to increase electricity consumption." The Court followed
precedent establishing that commercial speech is deserving of
something less than the full First Amendment protection af-
forded noncommercial speech7' and developed a four-part test
to evaluate the constitutionality of commercial speech regu-
lations.?2  The test stated that regulation of (1) non-
misleading, legal, commercial speech requires (2) a substan-
tial government interest; if such an interest exists, the regu-
lation must (3) directly advance that government interest, and
(4) be no more extensive than necessary to serve that inter-
est.'m
The Central Hudson test has been interpreted in various
ways. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico,74 the Court considered a First Amendment chal-
lenge to a regulation banning gambling advertisements aimed
at Puerto Rican residents.'m After establishing that the ad-
vertisements were neither illegal nor misleading,8 the Court
deferred to Congress' judgment, applying a reasonableness
test and finding that the statute satisfied the fourth prong of
the Central Hudson test.' The Court reasoned that because
Congress has the power to ban gambling altogether, it must
also be able to take the less drastic measure of banning gam-
bling advertisements.
The Central Hudson test was reinterpreted in 44 Liquor-
mart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,' which involved a First Amend-
ment challenge to a Rhode Island statute banning alcohol
price advertisements.' Writing for a plurality,8' Justice Stev-
70 See fi. at 571-72.
71 See dr. at 562 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n. 436 U.S. 447. 455-56
(1978)). The Court rejected the strict scrutiny standard for laws affecting commer-
cial advertising. See &d. at 563-66.
72 See id. at 566. The Court defined commercial speech as "expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." Id. at 561.
73 See id. at 564. Misleading speech does not fall within the scope of the Central
Hudson test. See Sean P. Costello. Comment. Strange Brew: The State of Commer-
cial Speech Jurisprudence Before and After 44 Llquormart. Inc. v. Rhode Island. 47
CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 681. 741-42 (1997) ("Justice Blackmun wrote that commercial
speech restrictions that keep consumers in ignorance serve to keep the State's policy
choices... insulated from the vLsibfilty and scrutiny that direct regulation would
entail." (quoting Central Hudson. 447 U.S. at 575 (Blackmun. J. concurring))).
74 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
75 See id. at 333-34.
76 See id. at 340-41.
77 See id. at 342 ("Mhe legislature's belief [that advertising would increase the
demand for gambling is a reasonable one. . .
78 See fd. at 345-46.
7 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
80 See id. at 489-90. A number of commercial speech cases were decided between
Posadas and 44 Liquormart. Each of them applied the Central Hudson test to a
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ens explained that neither the common sense distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech nor the in-
creased durability of commercial information could Justify the
deferential standard of review applied in Posadas.°  Accord-
ing to Stevens, a complete ban on alcohol advertising could
be justified only by "strong evidence" that the ban would sub-
stantially advance the government's interest in promoting
temperance.' Stevens thus called for a "more stringent con-
stitutional review... appropriate for the complete suppres-
sion of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech." The
plurality rejected the greater-includes-the-lesser logic from
PosadasP5 and determined that the regulation was not a "rea-
sonable fit" with the government's interest under Central
Hudson's fourth prong. The plurality's opinion in 44 Liq-
commercial speech regulation, but interpreted the test differently. These cases are
not relevant to an overview of the commercial speech doctrine because they do not
represent a significant doctrinal departure from earlier cases, and they are consid-
ered in the following Part's application of Central Hudson to Congress' Proposal. See
discussion infra Part III.
81 Plurality opinions do not carry the full force of precedent. When a divided
Court rules on a case, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." See
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). "Conse-
quently, under Marks the decision [in Posadas] may be viewed as being based on
Central Hudso's fourth prong and nothing more." Costello, supra note 73, at 689
n.31.
See 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 502 (deciding that despite its greater dura-
bility, bans on commercial speech should not be treated with "added deference").
See id. at 505.
84 Id. at 508. It is important to note that 44 Liquormart did not overrule Posadas"
finding that the government had a substantial interest in protecting the health and
well-being of its residents. See Costello, supra note 73, 721 n.245. Furthermore,
"the more demanding application of the third prong [as used in 44 Liquormart] is not
triggered unless there is a total or blanket prohibition on commercial speech." Id. at
732. Commentators have connected this application to the goals of the Court:
When the government regulates, but does not completely ban, commercial
messages to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales
practices or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the
Supreme Court uses a less stringent, more deferential standard of review.
Here, the government is not seeking to censor relevant consumer information,
but is helping assure that the message conveyed informs, rather than de-
ceives, consumers about health risks.
Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., FDA Regulation of Tobacco Advertising and Youth Smoking:
Historical, Social, and Constitutional Perspectives, 277 JAMA 410, 413 (1997) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
85 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 511-12.
See id. at 507. The "reasonable fit" language to describe the fourth prong of the
Central Hudson test was first used in Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). 44 Liquormart did not address the standard of review
to be used for various restrictions on commercial speech, except to affirm the Central
Hudson test as the standard of constitutional review in commercial speech cases.
See Diane Ritter. The First Amendment, Commercial Speech and the Future of Tobacco
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uormart, however, was only one of many opinions in the case
and created considerable confusion about the future applica-
tion of Central Hudson.'
The Court alleviated some of the confusion created by 44
Liquormart in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v.
United States,' which reconciled a split in the lower courtsP
concerning the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1304, a stat-
ute that "prohibit[ed] radio and television broadcasting... of
'any advertisement of... any lottery, gift enterprise, or simi-
lar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part
upon lot or chance... .'"9 In a per curiam decision, the
Court applied the Central Hudson test and found the statute
too broad and riddled with exceptions to pass First Amend-
ment scrutiny. Section 1304, according to the Court did not
directly or materially advance the government's interest in
curtailing gambling, nor was it a reasonable fit with that
goal.' Adopting a stricter, less deferential standard of review
Advertising After 44 Llquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island. 47 WAYNE L REV. 1505. 1527
(1997).
87 Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion in which he urged the Court to look to
state legislative practices at the time of the ratification of the First Amendment in
order to determine whether Rhode Island's statute violated the right to free speech.
See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 517-18 (Scalia. J.. concurring). Justice O'Connor.
also concurring, offered direct regulation of alcohol as an alternative means of
achieving the state's goal. See id. at 530 (O'Connor. J., concurring) (finding that the
regulation was not narrowly tailored because there were less restrictive measures
available, such as the direct regulation of alcohol). Justice Thomas. concurring in
part, strongly advocated the equal treatment of commercial and noncommercial
speech. He argued that because banning the product Itself Is always a more nar-
rowly tailored means of furthering the state's interests, prohibiting advertising Is al-
ways unnecessary and therefore unconstitutional under CenraL Hudson. See td. at
518 (Thomas, J., concurring): see also Kathleen Sullivan. Cheap Spirits. Cigarettes.
and Free Speech: The Imp/Ications of 44 Liquormart. 1996 SUP. Cr. REv. 123. 141
("Justice Thomas would hold that suppressing advertising is always an impermIssi-
ble means of suppressing demand for a good or service.").
119 S. Ct 1923 (1999).
Compare Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States. 149 F.3d 334 (5th
Cir. 1998) (holding that a statute prohibiting broadcast of ads for gambling was a
valid limitation on speech even after 44 Liquormart). with Valley Broad. Co. v. United
States, 107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that broadcast ban on gambling ads
violates the First Amendment), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1115 (1998). and Players Intl.
Inc. v. United States, 988 F. Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that a statutory ban
on the broadcast of casino gambling ads violates the First Amendment).
90 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. at 1927.
91 See id. at 1934 ("[There was 'little chance" that the speech restriction could
have directly and materially advanced its aim. 'while other provisions of the same Act
directly undermine[d] and counteract[edl its effects.- (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brew-
ing Co., 514 U.S. 476. 489 (1995))).
See id. at 1935 (finding that "decisions that select among speakers conveying
virtually identical messages are in serious tension with the principles undergirding
the First Amendment").
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than that employed in Posadas, the Court in Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting invalidated § 1304 as a violation of the
First Amendment and helped clarify the scope of the Central
Hudson test after 44 Liquormart.
93
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting did not diminish the
importance of Central Hudson in evaluating commercial
speech regulations. While it implied a stricter standard for
reviewing commercial speech restrictions than Central Hud-
son, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting spoke specifically to a
broad statute laden with exceptions and internal contradic-
tions.94 Statutes that are narrower or free from such contra-
dictions remain subject to the Central Hudson test as inter-
preted before Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, particularly
the third and fourth prongs of the test-the most closely and
frequently analyzed by the Court in determining the consti-
tutionality of commercial speech regulations.
B. Application of Central Hudson's Third and Fourth Prongs
1. Central Hudson's "Materially Advance" Standard
The third prong of the Central Hudson test originally re-
quired that, in order to pass First Amendment review, a
regulation must "directly advance" a substantial government
interest.95 In the first cases to apply Central Hudson, how-
ever, the original language was interpreted to articulate a
reasonableness test for determining the validity of commercial
speech regulations.9 In Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego," for
example, the Court deferred to local lawmakers' determina-
tion that a ban on billboard advertising would enhance traffic
safety, upholding the statute on the basis that "[t]here is
nothing [in the statute] to suggest that these [lawmakers']
judgments are unreasonable." This deferential standard
was echoed in PosadasP and welcomed by scholarly com-
9 See icL
94 For instance, § 1307 of the statute contained a long list of gambling advertise-
ments that were not subject to § 1304's legislative ban. See tcL at 1927-28 (except-
ing, among others, Indian gaming and state lotteries from § 1304's scope). The pres-
ence of these exceptions indicated that the statute did not constitute a "reasonable
fit" with Congress' stated goal of discouraging gambling. See Id.
95 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
96 See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341-42
(1986); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509 (1981).
97 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
98 Id. at 509.
9 See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342 ([Tihe legislature's belief [that advertising would
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mentators.10
0
The Court has recently begun to retract the Posadas stan-
dard, however, in favor of demanding a closer relationship
between a challenged regulation and an asserted government
interest. In Edenfield v. Fane,'O°  a statute forbidding in-
person solicitation by accountants was struck down because
the government did not prove on the record that the prohibi-
tion "materially advance[d]" the government's interest in pro-
tecting accountants' professional integrity.'0 The Court
found that purely prophylactic rules, that is, rules that fall
the "materially advance" standard, are only appropriate where
commercial speech is likely to mislead. '03
Despite the Court's apparent desire, evidenced in Eden-
field and 44 Liquormart," " to scrutinize commercial speech
regulations more carefully, it distinguished advertising re-
strictions from other commercial seech regulations in United
States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,' observing that "the Gov-
ernment may be said to advance its purpose [of reducing
gambling] by substantially reducing lottery advertising, even
where it [the advertising] is not wholly eradicated."'06 Not-
withstanding Edenfieldcs finding that purely prophylactic
rules do not satisfy Central Hudson's third prong, Edge
Broadcasting found that restricting gambling ads directly af-
fects demand, thereby materially advancing the government's
interest in reducing gambling. Edge Broadcasting thus rep-
increase residents' desire to gamble] is a reasonable one. . . ').
100 See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 30, at 72 ("We have every reason to believe that
commercial speakers can generally take care of their own interests without rigorous
free speech protection, beyond a requirement that the regulation be reasonable.").
101 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
'02 See Id. at 770-71 ([A] governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on
commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms It recites are real and that Its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of
Bus. and Profl Regulation. Bd. of Accountancy. 512 U.S. 136, 143 (1994) (same).
103 See Edenfe/L 507 U.S. at 774 (stating that a 'preventative rule was Justified
only in situations inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of miscon-
duct") (internal quotations omitted).
14 As indicated above. Justice Stevens attempted to raise the standard for up-
holding commercial speech regulations even further when he interpreted Central
Hudson's third prong to require "strong evidence" that a ban on alcohol price ads will
advance the State's goal of promoting temperance. See 44 Liquormart. Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996); see also discussion supra Part IIA4. Justice
Stevens! opinion, however, represented only a plurality of the Court and was not
based on the issue of material advancement. See Costello, supra note 73. at 687-88
n.31. Given 44 Liquonnras questionable authority, It would be premature to con-
sider it controlling in a case involving a mere restriction, rather than a complete ban.
on commercial speech.
105 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
10 T&. at 434.
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resented an exception to the strict review promoted in Eden-
field and 44 Liquormart for the evaluation of advertisements
for socially disfavored activities.
After establishing that advertising regulations are some-
times due more deference under Central Hudson, the Court
tightened its scrutiny of statutes whose enforcement was
deemed suspect under Edenfield's material advancement
standard. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 07 the Court deter-
mined that a ban on the inclusion of alcohol content on beer
labels did not materially advance the government interest in
frustrating strength wars among breweries because the stat-
ute was replete with exceptions and internal contradictions.""
In Rubin, and again in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting,9
the Court implied that not only must a regulation be aimed at
a substantial government interest in order to be considered
constitutional, it must also have some probability of achiev-
ing that interest. " Such statements represent a significant
departure from the "reasonableness" standard of Metromedia
and Posadas.
The combined effect of Edge Broadcasting, Edenfield, and
Rubin suggests that, while a regulation designed to restrict
advertising for a socially disfavored activity will receive a more
lenient standard of review, a regulation rife with exceptions
and internal contradictions will be invalidated under Central
Hudson's "materially advance" standard.
2. Central Hudson's Fourth Prong
The fourth prong of Central Hudson was dramatically al-
tered by the Court's decision in Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v. Fox."' The Court in Fox interpreted
Central Hudson's "not more extensive than is necessary" lan-
guage to require "a fit [between the regulation and the inter-
est it purports to serve] that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is 'in proportion to the inter-
est served.'""
' 2
107 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
108 See id. at 489. (-There [was] little chance that [the speech restriction could
have] directly and materially advance[d] Its aim, while other provisions of the same
Act directly undermineld] and counteracted] its effects.").109 119S. Ct. 1923 (1999).
11o See id. at 1934 (stating that there must be more than a "little chance" that the
restriction could advance the asserted interest); see also Rubln, 514 U.S. at 489.1 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
112 Id. at 480 (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
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Fogs deferential standard of review was challenged in City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,"' where the Court struck
down a city ban on newsracks displaying particular publica-
tions. The ban was adopted on the premise of improving the
aesthetics and safety of city sidewalks, but was struck down
as an unreasonable means of achieving the City's stated
goals. In a very narrow holding, the Court determined that
"the fact that the regulation 'provided only the most limited
incremental support for the interest asserted,' that it achieved
only a 'marginal degree of protection' for that interest- sup-
ported [the Court's] holding that the prohibition was inva-
lid."11 4 The Court invalidated the regulation because it bore
virtually no relation to the asserted government interest,
raising doubts about whether mere reasonableness would be
sufficient to satisfy Central Hudson's fourth 
prong. Ii
The reasonable fit standard of Fox was reaffirmed, how-
ever, in Florida Bar v. Went For It, InC.116 The Court in Florida
Bar upheld a statute banning attorneys from participating in
direct mail solicitation of accident victims. Despite the harsh
implications for commercial speech inherent in a regulatory
ban, the Court nonetheless found that the statute was a rea-
sonable fit with the state's interest in protecting accident vic-
tims from unnecessary stress and invasions of privacy, noting
that it had "made clear that the 'least restrictive means' test
has no role in the commercial speech context " ' 7 Although
seemingly just a reaffirmation of established doctrine, Florida
Bar proved significant to the future of regulatory limitations
on commercial speech. While the Court in 44 Liquormart
seemed inclined to alter the reasonable fit test to mirror
something like a more stringent "least restrictive means"
test,"' Florida Bar's clear support for a reasonable fit stan-
113 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
114 Id. at 427 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
115 See &d.
116 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
117 Id. at 632 (citing Fox 492 U.S. at 480).
118 See 44 Liquonnart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 507 ('The State also cannot satisfy the re-
quirement that its restriction on speech be no more extensive than necessary. It Is
perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation that would not involve any re-
striction on speech would be more likely to achieve the State's goal of promoting
temperance.").
The Court in 44 Liquormart seemed to imply that the presence of any means of
achieving the state's goals other than restricting speech would obviate any Justifica-
tion for a speech restriction. This "exhaustion of alternative means" theory Is di-
rectly analogous to the "least restrictive means" test denounced In Florida Bar. How-
ever, the fact that 44 Liquormart was a plurality decision eliminates the problem of
determining whether the Court intended to overrule Florida Bar. Instead. the regu-
lation at issue in 44 iquormart can be distinguished from the Proposal because it
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dard for regulatory bans on speech forces the Court to main-
tain at least the principle of deference to the legislature.
Lower court decisions since 44 Liquormart have empha-
sized the importance of the distinction between legislative
bans and mere restrictions on commercial speech under the
fourth prong of Central Hudson. Lower courts have adopted
an even more deferential standard than the one applied in
Fox for determining whether a reasonable fit exists between a
regulation and a substantial government interest, upholding
various statutes imposing restrictions on alcohol and tobacco
advertisements."9 The restrictions were found to be a rea-
sonable fit under Central Hudson because they limited adver-
tisements geographically, primarily to areas where children
were unlikely to see them, and, unlike the ban on commercial
speech in 44 Liquormart, did not interfere with the exchange
of important information.120 The circuit courts distinguished
44 Liquornart and refrained from applying strict First
Amendment scrutiny to the challenged regulations because
they were restrictions rather than bans on commercial
speech.'
21
Central Hudson's fourth prong has not changed signifi-
cantly since Fox, but has yet to be applied to a restriction
such as that suggested in Congress' anti-tax deduction Pro-
posal.
dealt with a prohibition, rather than merely a restriction, on commercial speech, a
distinction that has proven to be important within commercial speech doctrine.
The Court in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. also used language that seemed to im-
ply the adoption of a least restrictive means test, but this reasoning did not factor
into the final decision, and therefore is not clearly instructive with regard to the Pro-
posal. See Redish, supra note 41, at 623 (claiming that the Court In Rubin seemed
to be moving the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, the "reasonable fit" analy-
sis, back toward a "least restrictive means" test). In addition, Rubin, like 44 Liquor-
mart, involved a prohibition of speech rather than the type of restriction being con-
templated by the Proposal. Both of these differences make the reasoning in Rubin
less helpful in analyzing the Proposal's constitutionality.
Both Rubin and 44 Liquormart should be considered with caution by proponents
of Congress' Proposal, however, because they indicate exactly how, in the future de-
velopment of the commercial speech doctrine, "Itihe narrow tailoring inquiry can be
continued indefinitely by unsympathetic courts." WRIGHT, supra note 30, at 100.
119 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995) (alcohol
ads), aifd, 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996); Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995) (tobacco ads), affd, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.
1996).
120 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 101 F.3d at 327-28; Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc.,
101 F.3d at 333.
121 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 101 F.3d at 328; Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc., 101
F.3d at 333.
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Ill. THE ANTI-TAX DEDUCTION PROPOSAL
UNDER CENTRAL HUDSON
Congress' Proposal to withdraw tax-deductible status from
tobacco advertisements comports with constitutional stan-
dards for permitting commercial speech restrictions. To the
extent that tobacco ads are misleading, they may be ineligible
for First Amendment protection." Alternatively, even if to-
bacco ads are not misleading, Congress' Proposal still satis-
fies the Central Hudson test for evaluating the constitutional-
ity of regulations aimed at nonmisleading commercial
speech.12
The Court has consistently treated advertising as purely
commercial speech"2 and has recognized as substantial the
government's interest in protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens. 25 Congress' proposed advertising re-
striction "materially advances" this interest by frustrating the
activity being advertised" and represents a "reasonable fit"
with the government's interest in combating smoklng.'"
Moreover, because the Proposal is a restriction rather than a
ban on commercial speech, it is a rational means of achieving
the government's desired ends.'28 Finally, even if Congress'
122 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 447 U.S. 557.
563 (1980) ('The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive
the public than inform It.").
'3See Id. (explaining that the test requires (1) that the speech at issue be non-
misleading, lawful, commercial speech, and (2) that the government have a substan-
tial interest in regulating that speech; if such an interest exists, then the regulation
must (3) directly advance the government interest, and (4) be no more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest).
124 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.. 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (ads for legal services):
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (ads for submarine tours).
125 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States. 119 S. Ct 1923. 1931
(1999); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328. 341 (1988).
126 See United States v. Edge Broad.. Inc.. 509 U.S. 418. 434-35 (1993).
'27 Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
'28 This sentiment was echoed in recent lower court decisions in which restrictions
on commercial speech were treated more deferentially than bans on such speech.
See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke. 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995). affd 101
F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996); Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore. 63
F.3d 1318 (4th cir. 1995). qcfd, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996).
Critics of commercial speech regulations may claim that 44 Liquormart Is in-
dicative of the Court's interest in reinterpreting or even overruling Central Hudson.
especially its fourth prong, in an attempt to treat commercial speech more like non-
commercial speech under the First Amendment. See Costello. supra note 73. at 687-
88 n.31 ("Consequently, under Marks the decision may be viewed as being based on
Central Hudson's fourth prong and nothing more."); see also WRIGHT. supra note 30.
at 100 ('The narrow tailoring inquiry can be continued indefinitely by unsympathetic
courts."). This interest surfaced in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting. when the
Court moved further from Posadas' deferential standard by overturning a restriction
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Proposal fails to satisfy the Central Hudson test with respect
to the government's interest in discouraging smoking, how-
ever, it can nonetheless survive First Amendment scrutiny by
asserting a different government interest- an expressive in-
terest in publicly condemning tobacco companies' irresponsi-
ble marketing practices. With this substantial government
interest as its goal, the Proposal is likely to meet even the
strictest standards of review under Central Hudson and
therefore be upheld under the First Amendment.
A. Tobacco Advertisements Are Misleading
The Court has clearly stated that misleading advertising is
not protected in the same way as non-misleading commercial
speech." Deceitful information frustrates the First Amend-
ment's purpose of encouraging open discourse, and may even
do affirmative damage to consumers who rely on such infor-
mation to make economic decisions. " ' Tobacco advertise-
ments, such as those regulated by the Congress' Proposal,
are frequently misleading forms of communication and
therefore have little claim to First Amendment protection un-
der Central Hudson. For example, tobacco ads portray
smoking as a glamorous and athletic pursuit, without ade-
quately representing the extreme danger inherent in tobacco
consumption. In a recent issue of a national magazine, an
advertisement for a popular brand of cigarettes depicted three
rodeo cowboys posing for what appeared to be a post-contest
victory picture. 1 The ad unfolded to reveal another cowboy
on commercial speech due to its internal contradictions and exceptions. See Greater
New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. at 1935. Congress' anti-tax deduction Pro-
posal, however, does not suffer from the same internal inconsistencies, and therefore
remains just as likely to survive First Amendment scrutiny after Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting as before.
129 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) ("The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive
the public than to inform it."); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 217 (1982) (hold-
ing that professional advertisements by attorneys can be misleading and therefore
mad be regulated under the Central Hudson test).
See Costello, supra note 73, at 736 ("[Slome advertising might be more analo-
gous to 'incitement' than to 'advocacy.'"); see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) ("ITihe particular con-
sumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information... may be as keen, if not
keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."). There Is
also a strong state interest in ensuring that private economic decisions are properly
informed. See Costello, supra note 73, at 765. The Court has held that the state is
in no way prevented from "insuring that the stream of commercial information flow
cleanly as well as freely." Id. at 772.
131 See MAXIM, Oct. 1998, at 16-20.
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riding a bucking bronco above the caption "just warming
up."' The mandatory Surgeon General's Warning in the
bottom comer of the ad simply stated that "Cigarette Smoke
Contains Carbon Monoxide."33 As a result of this advertise-
ment, a consumer who is not aware of the medical effects of
carbon monoxide on the body remains uninformed as to the
true consequences of using cigarettes, and is left with the im-
pression that smoking is associated with a daring and excit-
ing lifestyle. Similarly, an ad for a different brand of ciga-
rettes promotes "Mighty Tasty Lifestyles."'" The Surgeon
General's Warning in the comer of this ad indicated that
"Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to
Your Health."'5 This warning is also insufficient to convey
the actual risks of smoking to the consumer, downplaying
smoking's dangers and allowing it to be falsely associated
with a glamorous lifestyle.
These examples represent the dominant trend in tobacco
advertisements: a denial of the unquestionably dangerous
and addictive nature of tobacco in hopes of appealing to
adults and young children to begin smoking in pursuit of a
more exciting and glamorous life." The warnings required by
law are woefully deficient representations of the dangers of
smoking: they neglect to inform an often misguided smoking
public about the probable negative consequences of their ac-
tions.'37 Tobacco advertisements, because of their failure to
communicate accurate information to their audience, are not
worthy of First Amendment protection under the Central
Hudson test' They are of low informational value because
they are typically misleading.39
132 Id.
133 Id.
13 Id. at 40-44.
135 Id.
136 See Vincent Blasi & Henry Paul Monaghan. The First Amendment and Cgarette
Advertising, 256 JAMA 502, 506 (1986). These authors note that:
no cigarette advertising gives adequate warning of the wide range of serious
and life threatening diseases induced by the ordinary use of the product.
Quite to the contrary, the effect of this advertising is to conceal or to minimize
these facts. Smoking is portrayed as not harmful, by associating it with tradl-
tionaly young, healthy, athletic, and virile activities. Moreover, no cigarette
advertising gives even the remotest suggestion that cigarettes are strongly ad-
dictive.
Id. (citation omitted).
137 See ird. at 503 (-The overriding fact is that many smoking adults... are not in
anposition to make a reasoned and informed Judgment about smoking.').
See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557.
563 (1980).
139 See Blasi & Monaghan, supru note 136, at 505 ("But current cigarette adver-
tising, appealing as it does to subconscious and nonrational associations simply to
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Despite evidence that tobacco ads are misleading, denying
First Amendment protection to such ads could serve as a
dangerous precedent justifying the denial of First Amendment
protection for other forms of socially disfavored speech. In
the case of tobacco advertising, however, the government's
strong interests in regulating tobacco ads provide additional
support for the constitutionality of such regulations. "'
B. Tobacco Advertisements Are Commercial Speech
Under Central Hudson
Advertisements are a classic example of commercial
speech, and the tobacco ads regulated by Congress' Proposal
are no exception. In Central Hudson, which involved the pro-
hibition of advertisements for public utilities, the Court de-
fined commercial speech as "expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience." 14 1 In
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,42 which involved a ban
on unsolicited contraceptive ads, the Court defined commer-
cial speech as communication that "does 'no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction.'"'" Other ways to distinguish
commercial speech have also been developed, defining speech
as noncommercial when the speaker "comes as close as rea-
sonably and inexpensively possible under the circumstances
to presenting it as noncommercial."" 4 Despite these various
definitions of commercial speech, advertisements have re-
mained the paradigmatic example of commercial discourse
under the First Amendment. 45 In particular, tobacco and al-
cohol ads have been uncontroversially treated as commercial
speech in many recent Supreme Court and circuit court
cases.'4 As a result, the tobacco advertisements targeted by
sell a product, has little or no such 'informational function.' This Is centrally true
even of those advertisements with some recognizable informational content, such
as... tar content."); David C. VIadeck & John Cary Sims, Why the Supreme Court
Will Uphold Strict Controls on Tobacco Advertising, 22 S. ILL. U.L.J. 651, 673 (1998)
(discussing the "very low informational value of [tobacco] advertisements").
140 See infra III.C.
141 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
142 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
143 Id. at 66 (citation omitted).
144 See WRIGHT, supra note 30, at 61.
145 See generally City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 507 U.S. 410, 421-
22 n.17 (1993) ("[Advertisements] are well calculated to enlarge and enlighten the
public mind, and are worthy of being enumerated among the many methods of
awakening and maintaining the popular attention, with which more modem
times... abound." (quoting DANIEL BoORsrIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL
EXPERIENCE 328, 415 (1958)) (internal citations omitted)).
146 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923
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Congress' Proposal are properly defined as commercial
speech.
C. Congress' Proposal Under Central Hudson's
Means/Ends Analysis
A commercial speech regulation must address a "substan-
tial government interest" in order to pass First Amendment
scrutiny. 47 It is widely accepted that the government has "a
compelling interest in tiying to reduce smoking,"" as tobacco
use can be directly connected to a wide variety of both medi-
cal and non-medical life risks, 4' and that advertising con-
tributes to the negative impact of tobacco by playing a signifi-
cant role in the recruitment of new smokers, many of whom
are children or young adults.'5 The limitations of current
non-legislative attempts to curb smoking further support
Congress' "substantial interest" in adopting legislation to
combat this epidemic."s
(1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island. 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Bad Frog Brewery.
Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1998); Anheuser-Busch.
Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996); Penn Adver. of Baltimore. Inc. v.
Mavor and City Council, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996).
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 447 U.S. 557. 564
(1980).
148 Benefits of Cigarette Ad Ban Would Outweigh Costs, supra note 1. at 1. See
Botvln et al., supra note 2, at 217; Jean Kilbourne. Cigarette Ads Target Women.
Young People, ALCOHOUSM & ADDICTION MAG.. Dec. 1988. at 22 ('Cigarettes are the
only product advertised which is lethal when used as ntended.-).
9 See Carl T. Bartecchi et al., The Human Costs of Tobacco Use (First of Two
Parts), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 907. 907-08 (1994) (In the United States in 1990.
smoking caused 179.820 deaths from cardiovascular disease... ISlmoking Is...
associated with cancers of the mouth, pharynx. larynx, esophagus. stomach, pan-
creas, uterine cervix, kidney, ureter, and bladder and accounts for about 30 percent
of all deaths from cancer.) (citation omitted); Botvln et al.. supra note 2. at 217
("Cigarette smoking is the leading preventable cause of mortality and morbidity in
the United States and has been described as the 'most important public health issue
of our time.1) (citation omitted); Thomas D. MacKenzie et al.. The Human Costs of
Tobacco Use (Second of Two Parts), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 975. 975 (1994) (Fires
related to cigarette smoking are the leading cause of civilian fire deaths in the United
States."); Mohammad R. Torabi et al., Cigarette Smoking as a Predictor of Alcohol and
Other Drug Use by Children and Adolescents: Evidence of the "Gateway Drug Effect.'
63 J. SCH. HEALTH 302, 302-05 (1993).
150 See Botvin et al.. supra note 2. at 221, 223. These authors report that:
[tihe results indicate that exposure to cigarette advertising is significantly cor-
related with reported smoking behavior. [Evidence... suggests that there
may be a causal relationship between cigarette advertising and smoking inl-
tiation.... IThere would appear to be ample evidence to warrant more careful
scrutiny by legislators of the Impact of cigarette advertising on children and
adolescents.
ICd (emphasis added).
See generally Thomas N. Robinson & Joel D. Killen. Do Cigarette Warning La-
bels Reduce Smoking?: Paradodcal Effects Among Adolescents. 151 ARCHIVES OF
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In order to survive constitutional scrutiny, however, Con-
gress' Proposal must do more than invoke a worthy cause.
The First Amendment requires that a commercial speech
regulation both materially advance and be a reasonable fit
with whatever substantial government interest it is meant to
address. 5 2 Congress' Proposal satisfies these criteria with re-
spect to two distinct government interests: (1) discouraging
people from smoking to promote public health; and (2) ex-
pressing governmental disdain for tobacco companies' un-
ethical business practices.
1. The Government's Interest in Promoting Public Health
There are a number of substantial smoking-related inter-
ests that the government may promote by removing tax de-
ductibility from tobacco advertisements. The most obvious of
these is "protecting the health, safety, and welfare of [Ameri-
can] citizens" by discouraging tobacco advertising and
thereby curbing smoking nationally." These interests were
found to satisly the Central Hudson test in Posadas,"'" and
were again recognized as valid in 44 Liquormar *55 and Greater
New Orleans Broadcasting15s The constitutionality of Con-
gress' Proposal, therefore, can be evaluated by applying the
third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson to the govem-
ment's interest in promoting the health and welfare of its citi-
zens.
a. The Proposal Materially Advances the Government's
Interest in Promoting Public Health
Central Hudson's third prong requires that a commercial
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 267, 271-72 (1997) ("Sizable proportions of adoles-
cents are not seeing, reading, and remembering cigarette warning labels on cigarette
packages and advertisements, and knowledge of warning labels was not associated
with subsequent decreased smoking."); Stapleton, supra note 13, at 6.
152 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923, 1930
(explaining the Centra Hudson test for determining the constitutionality of commer-
cial speech regulations).
153 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995); see also Posadas de P.R.
Ass'n v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) ("iTihe Puerto Rico Legisla-
ture's interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens constitutes a 'substan-
tial' governmental interest.").
15 See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341-43.
155 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 491 n.4 (1996) ("Ve...
have little difficulty in finding that the asserted governmental interests, herein de-
scribed as the promotion of temperance ... are substantial.").
156 119 S. Ct. 1923, 1931-32 (1999) (accepting the government's interest in cur-
tailing gambling as substantial).
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speech regulation "materially advance" an asserted govern-
ment interest Congress' Proposal removes the tax deductible
status from tobacco ads in order to reduce tobacco advertis-
ing, and, in turn, tobacco consumption. Edge Broadcasting
recognized that a connection between advertising and con-
sumption is sufficient to satisfy the third prong of Central
Hudson, concluding that the government was able to "materi-
ally advance" its interest in reducing gambling by reducing
lottery advertising. Similarly, burdening tobacco ads by
eliminating their tax-deductibility will "materially advance"
the government's interest in reducing smokling.'" Moreover,
because Congress' Proposal does not contain any of the in-
ternal contradictions that proved fatal to the regulation in
Rubin, enforcement of the Proposal will be uniform and con-
sistent with regard to all tobacco advertisements. In short,
the Proposal satisfies the material advancement standard be-
cause of its effectiveness in discouraging smoking.
b. Reasonable Fit
In order for a regulation to pass the fourth prong of Cen-
tral Hudson, it must also be a "reasonable fit" with the as-
serted government interest. The Court recently reaffirmed
this deferential standard of review in Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting, but has yet to articulate the appropriate appli-
cation of Central Hudson's fourth prong with respect to regu-
lations that are mere restrictions, rather than complete bans,
on commercial speech."
157 Although the statute upheld in Edge Broadcasting-- 18 U.S.C. § 1304- was
later invalidated in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, the Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting Court did not reject the theory presented in Edge Broadcasting that ad-
vertising is directly proportional to consumption. See Greater New Orleans Broad.
Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. at 1932 (tilt is no doubt fair to assume that more advertising
would have some impact on overall demand for gambling... .).
'-s The Court in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting did not apply the fourth prong
of Central Hudson to the commercial speech restriction at Issue in that case: the va-
lidity of the statute could be determined solely on the third prong analysis. See
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n. 119 S. Ct. at 1934-35 (referring only to the fact
that the statute does not directly and materially advance the government's stated
interests). Similarly, although the Court's Discovery Network decision addressed
"reasonable fit," it spoke primarily to regulations with "absolutely no bearing on the
[government] interests... asserted." finding no reasonable fit in a regulation that
arbitrarily singled out certain newsracks in order to combat a problem created col-
lectively by all newsracks. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network. Inc.. 507 U.S.
410, 428 (1993). While this decision is instructive to drafters of commercial speech
regulations, it is not relevant to an analysis of Congress' anti-tax deduction Proposal.
The Proposal affects all tobacco ads uniformly and is therefore sufficiently broad and
nonarbitrary to serve as a reasonable, nonincremental means of achieving the gov-
ernment's interest in reducing smoking.
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Florida Bar provided some insight into how commercial
speech restrictions would fare under Central Hudson. The
Court employed a lenient standard for evaluating the consti-
tutionality of bans on commercial speech and thus implied
that a similar or even more deferential standard should be
applied to mere restrictions which do not jeopardize a
speaker's rights as significantly as outright bans. As a result,
such restrictions are more likely to satisfy the Central Hudson
test. 159
Some lower courts have emphasized the importance of this
restriction/ban distinction in their treatment of commercial
speech regulations. While they generally apply a very strict
standard of review, making it nearly impossible for a ban on
commercial speech to satisfy either the third or fourth prong
of Central Hudson, lower courts have tended to defer to legis-
latures in determining the constitutionality of commercial
speech restrictions."6 The relaxed standard of review applied
to speech restrictions by many federal courts suggests that
Congress' tax-deduction Proposal will not be subject to the
more rigorous standard applied to advertising bans such as
those in Florida Bar and 44 Liquormart.
161
To an important degree, the viability of Congress' Pro-
posal-justified in terms of the goal of reducing smoking-
depends upon the resolution of this ban/restriction issue.
The question of whether a commercial speech regulation is a
reasonable fit with such an interest is generally a factual one,
and the degree of deference afforded to the legislature can
159 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 (1996) (referring to
the "special dangers that attend complete bans on truthful, nonmisleading commer-
cial speech").
160 See, e.g., Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87,
90 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a complete prohibition of a particular beer label nei-
ther materially advances the substantial state interest, nor is narrowly tailored to do
so). The challenged prohibition did not materially advance the state's interest. It
was "more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted state interest... [and it]
lack[ed] a 'reasonable fit' with [that] ... interest." Id. at 101.
161 The remaining question, however, is whether the Supreme Court will adopt the
lower courts' distinction between restrictions and bans on commercial speech. Al-
though 44 Liquormart dealt exclusively with a regulatory ban on commercial speech.
it is unclear whether the plurality opinion was meant to be read narrowly- allowing
greater deference to commercial speech restrictions in accord with lower court
precedent- or more broadly- as in Justice Thomas' concurrence- affording com-
mercial speech the same strict First Amendment scrutiny applied to noncommercial
speech. Similarly, because the Court in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting relied
solely on the third prong of Central Hudson in evaluating a commercial speech re-
striction, it remains unclear whether the Court will recognize the ban/restriction
distinction favored by the lower courts. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, 119
S. Ct. at 1934-35.
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often be determinative of the regulation's constitutionality.'6
In this climate of uncertainty, it is appropriate to evaluate
Congress' Proposal with respect to the government's second
interest in removing the tax-deductible status of tobacco ad-
vertising: publicly condemning tobacco companies' irrespon-
sible business practices.
2. The Government's Expressive Interest
The govemment has a substantial interest in condemning
tobacco companies' irresponsible and deceitful business
practices.'6 Cigarette manufacturers contribute to the seri-
ous health risks and social costs of smoking by irresponsibly
producing misleading and uninformative advertising cam-
paigns designed to attract new smokers and encourage cur-
rent smokers to continue."" Congress' Proposal, by imposing
a substantial financial burden on tobacco advertising, ex-
presses the govenment's disapproval of tobacco marketing
methods and provides a strong incentive for cigarette manu-
facturers to amend their business practices.
A government interest in condemning tobacco advertise-
ments by removing their tax deductibility satisfies the "sub-
stantial interest" prong of Central Hudson by effectively ad-
dressing a serious social problem in a way that benefits the
nation as a whole. 6s This expressive government interest is
not in the suppression of commercial speech per se, but in
the apportionment of government funds in a way that sym-
bolizes government concern with the dangers of smoking and
with the national welfare.
Congress' anti-tax deduction Proposal embodies Congress'
condemnation of tobacco companies' irresponsible business
'
62 The significance of different standards of legislative deference is also evidenced
in the Court's equal protection doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment. where
graduated levels of constitutional review were first developed. See. e.g.. Plyler v. Doe.
457 U.S. 202. 216-17 (1982) (distinguishing the various levels of review appropriate
for different legislative classifications under the Equal Protection clause): Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190. 210 (1976) (Powell. J. concurring) (same).
163 See WRIGHT, supra note 30, at 88-89.
1 See Blasi & Monaghan, supra note 136, at 503 (rThe [tobacco) industry's cur-
rent advertising is inherently deceptive and misleading."); Botvln et al.. supra note 2.
at 221, 223 ("[Rlesults indicate that exposure to cigarette advertising is significantly
correlated with reported smoking behavior... evidence... suggests that there may
be [al causal relationship between cigarette advertising and smoking initiation."): see
also supra Part II.A (describing misleading tobacco ads).
165 See Posadas de P.R. Ass'n v. Tourism Co. of P.R.. 478 U.S. 328. 341 (1986) (ex-
plaining that promoting the general welfare of the people is itself a substantial gov-
ernment interest under Central Hudson).
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practices.l' The government's condemnation represents a
substantial expressive interest under Central Hudson because
it targets "the marketing practices or commercial speech or
conduct that... government is reasonably justified in con-
sidering risky or socially irresponsible, in the sense of mar-
keting that may involve frequent, extremely serious- if un-
demonstrable- harms with no proportionate social
benefit."" The social hanns which result from smoking
clearly represent "frequent, extremely serious ... harms with
no proportionate social benefit."'6 Smoking is the nation's
leading preventable cause of death;'6 9 it is responsible for
causing a wide variety of potentially fatal illnesses 7 0 and is
the leading cause of civilian fire deaths in the United
States.17 1 Cigarette manufacturers are implicated in smok-
ing's social harms because of their deceptive advertising and
under-inclusive warnings to consumers. Congress is justi-
fied in considering tobacco companies' misrepresentations
socially irresponsible and, therefore, an appropriate target of
expressive legislation; "3 the product is extremely harmful and
the potential benefits of consumer education about tobacco
substantial. In short, the social dangers of smoking are suffi-
cient to justify a substantial government interest in declining
to fund the irresponsible acts of the tobacco industry in pro-
moting their harmful product.
166See WRIGHT, supra note 30, at 88-89 ("An expressive public policy expresses the
public endorsement or condemnation of some idea, practice, or state of affairs....
[A]dvertising can be irresponsible even if the effects allegedly flowing from that ad-
vertising are themselves not certain.").
167 Id. at 91.
' Id. See also Botvin et al., supra note 2, at 217 ("Cigarette smoking is the lead-
ing preventable cause of mortality... in the United States and has been described
as the 'most important public health issue of our time.'").
169 See id.
170 See Charles S. Fuchs et al., A Prospective Study of Cigarette Smoking and the
Risk of Pancreatic Cancer, 156 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2255, 2258 (1996) (ex-
plaining a "consistent, independent positive association between cigarette smoking
and the risk of pancreatic cancer... among current smokers"); J.W.G. Yarnell.
Smoking and Cardiovascular Disease, 89 Q.J. MED. 493 (1996) ("[Simoking has been
closely linked with ischaemic heart disease, stroke, peripheral arterial disease, aortic
aneurysm and pulmonary heart disease in numerous... studies.").
71 See MacKenzie et al., supra note 149, at 75.
172 See Blasi & Monaghan, supra note 136, at 506 ("[N]o cigarette advertising gives
even the remotest suggestion that cigarettes are strongly addictive."); Thomas N.
Robinson & Joel D. Killen, supra note 151, at 267 (1997) ("Sizable proportions of
adolescents are not seeing, reading, and remembering cigarette warning labels on
cigarette packages and advertisements.... 1.
See WRIGHT, supra note 30, at 89 ("Even if the causal relationships between ad-
vertising and tobacco consumption are unclear, it is irresponsible for tobacco sellers
to risk the basic health, or possible addiction to an unhealthy substance of large
numbers of even voluntary consumers ...
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A potential problem arises, however, with the recognition
of expressive interests under Central Hudson. Simply in-
tending to condemn a particular form of speech could justify
regulations beyond the scope of what the Court has estab-
lished as appropriate limits on commercial speech. For ex-
ample, in the interest of condemning excessive television
watching by children, Congress may want to ban television
advertisements directed at minors. While the passage of this
regulation would clearly express the government's desire that
kids watch less television, it offends the intuition that speech
should not be silenced by government intervention; merely
claiming such an expressive interest should not be sufficient
to justify such a harsh regulation.
Finding an expressive governmental interest in regulating
commercial speech, however, does not necessarily create a
slippery slope toward government censorship of such speech.
Although it may seem easier for a regulation motivated by an
expressive governmental interest to overcome the Central
Hudson requirement that the government have a substantial
interest in limiting speech, such a regulation must still satisfy
the two remaining Central Hudson prongs in order to pass
constitutional muster. A regulation that is overly restrictive
or unreasonably tailored to achieve an expressive interest will
fail to pass First Amendment scrutiny under Central Hudson
regardless of the expressive interest the government claims as
its justification.
The Court's evaluation of the statute in 44 Liquormart-
banning all alcohol price ads appearing outside of liquor
stores- perfectly illustrates the vitality of Central Hudson re-
gardless of the character of the governmental interest at is-
sue. The Court struck down the ban on alcohol ads because
it was not a reasonable fit with the government's interest in
decreasing alcohol consumption. This result would be the
same even if the government had relied on an expressive in-
terest in condemning drinking to justify the regulation. The
complete ban on commercial speech in 44 Liquormart is not a
reasonable means of expressing disdain for a particular ac-
tivity or social practice because it unduly burdens speech
under the First Amendment. Therefore, while partial restric-
tions on commercial speech, such as Congress' anti-tax de-
duction Proposal, may be a constitutional means of achieving
an expressive government interest, more intrusive statutes,
such as the advertising ban at issue in 44 Liquormart, will be
invalidated because they cannot satisfy Central Hudson's rea-
sonable fit requirement.
Consideration of the government's expressive interest in
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removing tax deductibility from tobacco ads does not dra-
matically alter the Court's commercial speech doctrine or
pave the way for complete governmental control over com-
mercial speech. Recognizing the expressive interest inherent
in Congress' Proposal simply shifts more emphasis to the
third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson in evaluating the
Proposal's constitutionality.
a. The Proposal Materially Advances the Government's
Interest in Condemning the Tobacco Industry
The inherent differences in evaluating expressive govern-
ment interests under the Central Hudson test render much of
the Court's interpretation of the material advancement prong
of that test inapplicable to Congress' Proposal. For example,
the Court in Edenfieid v. Fane" overturned a statute because
the government could not prove "on the record" that banning
commercial speech in that case would materially advance the
asserted government interest. 75 This standard is not appli-
cable to the Proposal's expressive government interest, how-
ever, because there is no way to prove on the record whether
Congress' Proposal successfully expresses the government's
message, or whether a sufficient number of people under-
stand it. Proof that an expressive interest is actually fur-
thered is too elusive to provide a means of deciding a regula-
tion's constitutionality.
Similarly, the Court's finding in Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 76 that a commercial speech regulation containing nu-
merous exceptions cannot materially advance its purported
interest,'7 7 is not applicable to the present analysis. Con-
gress' Proposal conveys a consistent sentiment: tobacco
companies behave irresponsibly by recruiting new smokers
and promoting their products with deceptive advertising. The
Proposal does not include any exceptions to its goal of ex-
pressing its anti-tobacco position, nor is it likely that an ex-
pressive government interest would ever include such excep-
tions. The unique character of an expressive interest,
therefore, requires a different method for evaluating commer-
cial speech regulations motivated by government disdain for
174 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
Id. at 777 (holding that banning in-person solicitation by CPAs would not mate-
rially advance the government's interest in protecting accountants' professional in-
te rity).
514 U.S. 476 (1995).
1 See i. at 489 (noting that the labeling ban has certain provisions that materi-
ally advance its aim, and other provisions that undermine and counteract Its effects).
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"the socially irresponsible behavior of the seller, in this case
the tobacco companies." 8
A more appropriate standard for determining material ad-
vancement in cases involving expressive government interests
is the "alternate channels" analysis used in evaluating time,
place, and manner restrictions under the First Amendment.m
Valid time, place, and manner restrictions must satisfy two
criteria: (1) they must leave open "alternative channels" for
the communication of the regulated speech; and (2) those al-
ternative channels cannot be "prohibitively more expensive,
not markedly more inconvenient, and not significantly less
effective as a means of broadcasting the message." "
These criteria can be combined to establish a third prong
of the Central Hudson test appropriate for regulations moti-
vated by an expressive government interest The alternative
channel test is not overly restrictive because it applies almost
exclusively to regulations that eradicate a particular message
altogether, namely, complete bans on commercial speech.
The Supreme Court in 44 Liquormart implied that striking
down total bans on commercial speech is not constitutionally
problematic or overreaching because such bans impair a
speaker's constitutional right to free speech severely enough
to require close First Amendment scrutiny.81 At the same
time, the alternate channel test is not so lax as to allow the
government to silence speakers otherwise deserving of First
Amendment protection under the pretext of expressing the
government's own message. Preventing such an abuse of
power protects against government censorship.'62 The alter-
native channel test provides an effective means of evaluating
expressive government interests under Central Hudson's third
prong by recognizing both the policy-making role of govern-
178 WRIGHT, supra note 30, at 90.
'7 The Supreme Court has permitted regulations limiting the time. place. and
manner of speech, provided that "alternate channels" of expression remain available
to the speaker. See, e.g.. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding a city
limit on the use of loudspeakers as a permissible time, place, and manner restriction
of speech). In the context of noncommercial speech, a time. place. and manner re-
striction must also be justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech and must be narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest.
See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288. 293 (1984). The
content-based character of Congress's Proposal is discussed fnfra Part V.
1S ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 39, at 152.
181 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island. 517 U.S. 484, 508 (stating that a ban
on advertising must survive "more stringent constitutional review than was appro-
priate for the complete suppression of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech).
182 See ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 39, at 36 (deriving "the necessity for open dis-
cussion [reflected in the First Amendment] from... [a] fundamental program of self-
government defined in.. .the Constitution).
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ment and the potential for it to be abused.
Congress' Proposal materially advances a substantial gov-
ernment interest under the alternate channel test. Removing
tax deductibility from tobacco ads does not close any chan-
nels of communication. While it does make advertising more
costly, consistent consumer demand for cigarettes"a and the
enormous industry-wide budget for tobacco advertising' 84 in-
dicate that the loss of tax deductions for advertising expenses
will not make tobacco ads "prohibitively expensive," "mark-
edly more inconvenient," or a "significantly less effective"
means of communication.'8 Moreover, the alternate channels
test preserves the power of listeners to influence the message
and methods of speakers- tobacco companies in this case-
without gaining the power to silence those speakers in a way
that is irreconcilable with the First Amendment. The gov-
ernment will thus be able to use its regulatory power to call
attention to the tobacco companies' irresponsible business
practices, but will be prevented under the alternative chan-
nels standard from committing clear First Amendment viola-
tions, such as eradicating altogether the rights of tobacco
companies to dispense commercial messages.
b. The Proposal Represents a Reasonable Fit With the
Government's Expressive Interest in Condemning
Tobacco Industry Practices
Central Hudson's fourth prong requires that a commercial
speech regulation represent a "reasonable fit" with the as-
serted government interest. Congress' Proposal is a rea-
sonable means of achieving the government's interest in ex-
pressing its dissatisfaction with tobacco companies'
irresponsible business practices.
The Proposal is "in proportion to the interest served," as it
is neither an excessively restrictive means of conveying the
government's sentiments regarding tobacco ads, nor so lim-
ited as to be entirely ineffectual in achieving this purpose.
The Proposal will not eradicate tobacco companies' ability to
1 See Pierce et al., supra note 3, at 514 (reporting that "54,454... adolescents
(or 17% of the total population of this age) ... experiment with cigarettes before they
reached the age of 18 years").
184 See Stover, supra note 6, at 1 ("IA]dvertising Is a potent weapon for tobacco
companies in their war to win young smokers.").
185 ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 39, at 152.
1 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923,
1932 (1999); Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989).
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convey their commercial message, nor will it make it appre-
ciably more inconvenient for them to do so. Singling out to-
bacco ads for the removal of tax deductibility is a clear and
reasonable method of expressing the government's lack of
support for the industry's deceptive advertising practices. Fi-
nally, unlike the regulation invalidated in Discovery Network,
Congress' Proposal is sufficiently uniform in its application to
pass scrutiny under Central Hudson's fourth prong. The Pro-
posal should therefore be upheld as a valid restriction on
commercial speech under the First Amendment.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE REGARDING CONTENT-BASED
SPEECH RESTRICTIONS ON GOVERNMENT FUNDING
Congress' Proposal is a valid government funding decision,
rather than an unconstitutional content-based restriction on
speech, under the First Amendment.' Although a "statute is
presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it
imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the con-
tent of their speech," ' s Supreme Court decisions regarding
First Amendment taxation have concentrated solely on the
constitutionality of taxes on noncommercial speech; the
Court has never evaluated taxes levied on commercial speech.
Moreover, the Court's treatment of First Amendment chal-
lenges to selective congressional funding establish that Con-
gress may selectively allocate government funds without vio-
lating the constitutional rights of the funds' recipients. '6 The
187 For a discussion of another objection to Congress' Proposal. see supra Part
II.C. (explaining the Proposal's validity under the Court's commercial speech doc-
trine).
'88 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd..
502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991). Because the point of Congress' Proposal Is to combat the
effects of tobacco advertisements that promote the use of tobacco products. it argua-
bly represents not only content discrimination, but viewpoint discrimination as well.
Content-based regulations target speech because of Its subject matter, regardless of
the point of view the speech reflects (e.g., a law prohibiting any discussion of abor-
tion, pro or con). Viewpoint-based regulations, however, are the most constitution-
ally suspect form of content discrimination because they restrict the expression of
particular points of view. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Vir-
ginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) ('Viewpoint discrimination Is... an egregious form
of content discrimination."). Thus, however unlikely it is that Congress would wish
to impose a tax burden on anti-smoking ads, the Proposal does not distinguish be-
tween ads that promote tobacco use and those that discourage it. Accordingly. the
focus of the present analysis is limited to content-based speech regulations.
'89 See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding
a "decency" requirement imposed on federal arts funds on the grounds that subjec-
tive funding decisions are within Congress' spending power): Rust v. Sullivan. 500
U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding Congress' exclusion of abortion counseling from Title X
funding on the grounds that Congress has the discretion to decide the scope of gov-
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Proposal is not an impermissible content-based restriction on
speech, but is instead an exercise of Congress' authority to
preferentially fund particular programs. Accordingly, Con-
gress' Proposal represents a valid economic policy decision
within the bounds of the First Amendment more closely
analogous to the regulations at issue in the Court's selective
funding cases than to those invalidated on the basis of con-
tent discrimination.
A. The Anti-Tax Deduction Proposal Is Not
an Unconstitutional Content-Based Restriction of Speech
Although the Court has yet to decide a case involving the
constitutionality of commercial speech taxation, the same
considerations that led the Court to extend less constitutional
protection to commercial speech justify a more relaxed stan-
dard of review for taxes levied against such speech. While
generally applicable taxes on noncommercial speech have
routinely been upheld under the First Amendment, content-
based taxes on noncommercial speech have been consistently
invalidated. The Court's decisions involving content-based
taxes on speech, however, have only addressed government
regulation of noncommercial speech; it thus remains uncer-
tain whether a purely commercial speech regulation such as
Congress' Proposal will face equally strict constitutional
scrutiny.
The federal government is vested with the power to levy
taxes on different forms of speech, 9° including noncommer-
cial speech, provided such taxes are content-neutral " ' and
not "aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."'"  In
Cammarano v. United States,93 the Court upheld a uniform
ernment programs). The removal of tax deductibility from tobacco ads is, for pur-
poses of the First Amendment, tantamount to an additional tax on such advertise-
ments. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
789-94 (1973) (dismissing as constitutionally insignificant the inquiry as to whether
the financial burden being imposed is an additional tax or the denial of a tax deduc-
tion).
190 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have the Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises....").191 See Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Ex-
pression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 569 (1996) ("[lit is appropriate to draw a line that al-
lows government to subsidize speech in a categorical manner but simultaneously
denies it the power to subsidize on the basis of viewpoint.").192 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (citation omitted).
193 See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (upholding regulation
that denies tax deduction uniformly for business expenses spent on lobbying); see
also University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201 (1990) (stating that "the First
Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening... that may result from
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denial of tax deductions to lobbying organizations on the
premise that the financial burden was not imposed due to the
specific content of the speech being regulated.
However, in Grosjean v. American Press Co.,'0 the Court
struck down a Los Angeles sales tax aimed specifically at
large newspapers primarily because the tax was discrimina-
tory,195 but also because it involved "a deliberate and calcu-
lated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of in-
formation to which the public is entitled in virtue of the
constitutional guaranties." ' 9 The tax was invalidated, there-
fore, not only because it was content-based, but also because
it was born of an invidious legislative motive.
Nearly fifty years later, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,'" a tax on ink and paper
was invalidated because it only affected a small number of
large newspapers. Instead of simply striking down the stat-
ute as a facially content-based speech regulation in violation
of the First Amendment, the Court relied on Grosjean to em-
phasize the importance of an invidious legislative motive in
assessing constitutionality."g The Court extended its holding
in Minneapolis Star in Regan v. Taxation with Representation
of Washington1z when it "reject[ed] the 'notion that First
Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they
are subsidized by the State.'"2 This statement seemed to
give legislatures much more leeway to levy taxes against cer-
tain forms of speech, provided there was no "explicit demon-
stration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive dis-
crimination against particular persons and classes. " '
the enforcement of civil... statutes of general applicablity) (citation omitted].
194 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
195 See it. at 250 (holding that a tax "single in kind, with a long history of hostile
misuse against the freedom of the press" is unconstitutional); see also City of Balti-
more v. A.S. Abell Co., 145 A.2d 111, 120 (Md. 1958) (finding that since 90-95% of a
taxs impact fell on newspapers, radio, and television, the tax was .single in kind"
and therefore unconstitutional).
196 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250.
197 460 U.S. 575, 591 (1983). The Court also invalidated the tax because it singled
out the press. See irL
198 See f&L at 580 ("We think that the result in GrosJean may have been attributable
in part to the perception on the part of the Court that the State imposed the tax with
an intent to penalize a selected group of newspapers.). Mimeapolis Sta's require-
ment that a statute must contain an invidious motive in order to be found uncon-
stitutional was inconsistent with Spefser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). an earlier
case in which a statute was invalidated because it was a prima facie content-based
restriction on speech.
199 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (quoting Cammarano v. United States. 388 U.S. 498. 515
(1959) (Douglas, J. concurring)).
Id. at 546 (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83. 87-88 (1940)).201 Id& at 547.
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In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland 2' however,
the Court retreated from the legislative intent-based analysis
of Grosjean and Minneapolis Star, focusing instead solely on
whether the challenged tax exemption discriminated on the
basis of the regulated speech's content . In invalidating the
tax, the Court required the state to provide a "compelling
justification" in order to retain a differentiated tax.204 Justice
Scalia, in dissent, argued in favor of a rational basis test for
review of differential tax exemptions, noting that a "wide vari-
ety of [content-based] tax preferences and subsidies" already
exist, and "that denial of participation in a tax exemption...
does not necessarily infringe a fundamental right.., such a
denial does not, as a general rule, have any significant coer-
cive effect."
205
Justice Scalia's reasoning in his Arkansas Writers' dissent
took hold in Leathers v. Medlock,2m in which the Court indi-
cated that tax exemptions would be presumed constitutional
absent some explicit demonstration of the statute's hostile
and oppressive discrimination against particular thoughts or
ideas. 0' The Court found that differentiated tax exemptions
should be invalidated only if they can be characterized as a
"penalty for the few. "2" Congress' Proposal, while seemingly
content-based, is significantly different from the taxes invali-
dated in Minnesota Star, Regan, and Arkansas Writers' in that
it only taxes commercial speech. Because commercial speech
has historically been granted less constitutional protection
481 U.S. 221 (1987).
See id. at 229 (holding the tax unconstitutional because "the Arkansas sales tax
scheme treats some magazines less favorably than others"). The Court's holding In
Arkansas Writers' was a return to the standard developed in Spelser. See Speiser,
357 U.S. at 518.
204 Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 234.
205 Id. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The rational basis standard referred to here
is analogous to the test used in equal protection analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 349 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (rejecting
an equal protection claim because although the challenged statute treated opticians
and optometrists differently, it reflected a "rational" means of addressing a legitimate
state interest).
06 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
207 See id. at 448-49 (holding that a general tax with exceptions for some members
of the press but not others, such as cable TV, is not unconstitutional).
28 Id. at 448 ("[EIxtension of its sales tax to cable television hardly resembles a
'penalty for the few.'") (citation omitted). In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
391 (1992), however, the Court struck down a statute forbidding racially or relig-
iously-motivated fighting words on the basis that the regulation was an impermissi-
ble content-based restriction of free speech. This suggests that Justice Scalia and
other members of the current Court view differentiated tax exemptions as a less
critical infringement on the principles of free speech than direct regulations on the
content of public speech.
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than noncommercial speech, it is unclear to what extent the
taxation cases involving noncommercial speech apply to Con-
gress' Proposal. Moreover, none of the Court's previous
commercial speech cases address the potentially discrimina-
tory nature of commercial speech regulations. These facts,
together with the Court's selective funding decisions, make it
unlikely that Congress' Proposal will qualify as an impermis-
sible, content-based speech restriction.
B. The Proposal Is a Valid
Selective Government Funding Decision
Congress' anti-tax deduction Proposal is a permissible se-
lective funding decision under the First Amendment. In Rust
v. Sulfivan,"9 the Court recognized Congress' power to make
content-based funding decisions regarding government pro-
grams. Rust addressed whether the exclusion of programs
involving abortion from Title X funding '0 amounted to an un-
constitutional attempt by the government to silence a par-
ticular viewpoint, or a constitutionally permissible means of
discouraging abortion.21 ' The Court held that
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selec-
tively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an
alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in an-
other way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one ac-
tivity to the exclusion of the other.
212
The expressive interest embodied in Congress' anti-tax de-
duction Proposal resembles the government's use of financial
incentives to discourage abortion upheld in Rust: just as Ti-
tle X's selective funding was a constitutionally permissible
expression of the government's lack of support for abortion,
the Proposal's removal of tax deductibility is a constitution-
ally permissible expression of congressional disdain for the
2o9 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
210 See nle X of the Public Health Service Act. 42 U.S.C.S. § 300-300a-41 (1991).
211 See Redish & Kessler, supra note 191. at 575 (According to the Court In Rust.
the regulations constituted not an improper government 'carrot designed to silence
expression of a particular viewpoint, but rather a self-defined governmental program
the purpose of which was to deter abortions, or at least promote alternatives to
abortion."); see atso Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297. 317 n.19 (1980) (A refusal to
fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a
'penalty' on that activity."); Maher v. Roe. 432 U.S. 464. 474 (1977) (holding that the
government may "make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and...
implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds).
2 See Rust 500 U.S. at 193.
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tobacco industry's objectionable business practices.
Since Rust, the Court has decided two cases that cast
doubt on its commitment to the selective funding principle.
In Simon & Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board,1 3 the Court invalidated a statute requiring a
convicted criminal to forfeit the proceeds from any reenact-
ment of his crime or the associated story. The Court found
that the law unconstitutionally "singles out income derived
from expressive activity for a burden the state places on no
other income, and it is directed only at works with a specified
content."214  This statute is distinguishable from Congress'
Proposal regarding the tax deductibility of tobacco ads. The
speech at issue in Simon & Schuster was noncommercial; the
Court never addressed the consequences of a law placing a
similar financial burden on commercial speech. Given the
historical distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech, the Court is likely to evaluate Congress' Proposal un-
der a less demanding constitutional standard than that em-
ployed in Simon & Schuster.
Similarly, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univer-
sity of Virginia,215 the Court invalidated a decision by the Uni-
versity to deny funding to a student group intending to pub-
lish a Christian periodical. The University's decision was
inconsistent with the First Amendment, according to the
Court, because it singled out the publication based on its
content, denying it a grant it was otherwise qualified to re-
ceive.1 Distinguishing between the funding of governmental
and private speech, the Court held that selective funding is
permissible for speakers with a "governmental message," but
not for speakers, such as the Christian group, engaged in
private speech."'
Congress' Proposal satisfies the standard set forth in Ro-
senberger. First, the speech which the University refused to
fund was noncommercial. The recognized constitutional dif-
ference between commercial and noncommercial speech dis-
tinguishes Congress' regulation of tobacco advertising from a
public university's restriction of private speakers. Second,
Congress' Proposal is aimed at speech that is comparable to a
governmental message. Unlike the religious speech at issue
213 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
214 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116.
215 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
216 See id. at 837 (holding that the "regulation invoked to deny... Ifinancial sup-
port is a denial of [petitioner's] right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment").
217 Id. at 833-34.
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in Rosenberger, tobacco advertisements implicate a govern-
ment interest by posing a threat to the national welfare.
When subsidized speech, even by a private actor, is di-
rectly contrary to a government message, such speech must
be amenable to government regulation as something greater
than (exclusively) private speech. Thus, despite Rosenber-
ger's apparent limitation on the selective funding doctrine,
Congress' Proposal is still valid because it satisfies Rosenber-
get's "governmental message" requirement.
The Court recently reaffirmed its selective funding doctrine
in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,"' upholding a
requirement that federal arts funding be available only to
those artists adhering to tenets of "decency and respect for
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public."M The
Court determined that the statute did not require unconsti-
tutional content-based discrimination in funding decisions
because it did not eliminate specific means of expression, but
simply increased the subjectivity of the selection process.
The Court implied, however, that the statute would not have
survived First Amendment scrutiny if it had been designed to
"drive 'certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace. "
Congress' Proposal is more akin to the subjective selection
process upheld in Finley than to an intentional act of censor-
ship. The government's interest in expressing its distaste for
the tobacco industry does not require or entail decimating to-
bacco companies' promotional efforts. Instead, Congress
merely declines to encourage tobacco ads in the interest of
public welfare. The removal of tax deductible status from to-
bacco ads is thus not an act of censorship, but a subjective
policy decision within the bounds of Congress' funding
authority.
A further consideration in assessing the constitutionality
of Congress' Proposal is the Court's unique treatment of fed-
eral funding for advertising. Federal funding of advertise-
ments has been virtually immune from First Amendment
scrutiny. In Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.,2 '
the Court evaluated a federal advertising program as a matter
of economic policy to be decided by "producers and adminis-
trators"' of the program, rather than as a First Amendment
218 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
219 Id. at 572 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1). the 1990 amendment to the National
Foundation of the Arts Act of 1965).
Id. at 587 (quoting Simon & Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
22' 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
SId. at 476.
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
issue to be decided by the courts. The Court stated that:
The First Amendment has never been, construed to require
heightened scrutiny of any financial burden that has the inci-
dental effect of constraining the size of a firm's advertising
budget. The fact that a regulation may indirectly lead to a re-
duction in a handler's individual advertising budget does not it-
self amount to a restriction on speech.?
This reasoning, like that in Rust, suggests that Congress'
Proposal implicates Congress' economic policy-making
authority rather than the First Amendment. If the Proposal Is
analyzed as an economic policy decision, and not as a con-
tent-based speech regulation, it will thus not be subject to
the rigorous First Amendment scrutiny that dooms most
content-based regulations of speech.
Congress' Proposal is comparable to these government
funding cases for three reasons. First, the Court has gone to
great lengths to establish the difference between commercial
and noncommercial speech, even developing an independent
test for the constitutionality of commercial speech restric-
tions.22 As a result, it is inappropriate to analogize a Pro-
posal dealing with purely commercial speech to First
Amendment taxation cases, all of which deal solely with
regulations of noncommercial speech." Second, the Court
has regularly heard cases involving advertising restrictions
without ever addressing the problem of content-based dis-
criminationm 6 Finally, the Court has already addressed the
propriety of a regulation designed to alter the advertising
budgets of particular taxpayers and has upheld that regula-
tion against a First Amendment challenge." Since Congress'
Proposal does not represent the type of impermissible con-
tent-based speech restrictions that have been struck down in
the past, it should be permitted under the First Amend-
ment.2m
s Id. at 470.
See supra Part II.C-D; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983);
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575
(1983); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); GrosJean v. American Press Co.. 297
U.S. 233 (1936).
226 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Posadas De
P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Central Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 557; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
227 See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
=8 See David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neu-
trality in Government Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U.L. REv. 675, 737 (1992) (%Vhere ...
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V. CONCLUSION
Congress' Proposal to remove the tax-deductible status of
tobacco advertisements is constitutional because it satisfies
both the Central Hudson test and First Amendment stan-
dards regarding differential taxation of speech. Because to-
bacco ads are typically misleading, they may be regulated
without violating the First Amendment. Indeed, even if to-
bacco ads are not found to be misleading, Congress' Proposal
nonetheless satisfies the Central Hudson test for evaluating
commercial speech regulations. Whether the government
claims it has a substantial interest in the welfare of its citi-
zens or, alternatively, in publicly condemning the irresponsi-
ble behavior of the tobacco industry, Congress' Proposal is
permissible because it both materially advances an important
government interest and represents a reasonable fit with that
interest.
The Proposal is also a permissible government funding de-
cision under the First Amendment. The Court has only
struck down content-based taxes on noncommercial speech.
In commercial speech cases- specifically those involving
limits on advertising- the Court has never raised the ques-
tion of whether a tax on commercial speech is impermissibly
content-based, but instead has consistently relied on the
Central Hudson test to determine a statute's constitutionality.
Moreover, the Court has consistently found that the govern-
ment may, in accord with the rational basis standard, tax
speech and other activities at its discretion. Accordingly,
Congress' Proposal to remove the tax deductible status of to-
bacco advertisements represents a permissible regulation of
commercial speech and an appropriate exercise of congres-
sional taxing power under the First Amendment.
government non-neutrality does not pose a substantial risk of skewing or Indoctri-
nating, it should be permitted.'). Cole presents a three-part test to determine If the
government should interfere with certain "spheres' of speech. He asks wvhcther gov-
ernment control of the content of speech in the institution would be threatening to a
vigorous public debate... whether the internal operation of the institution is con-
sistent with a first amendment neutrality mandate... whether the independence of
speakers can be structurally accommodated in some intermediate fashion.- Id. at
736. All three of ole's criteria are satisfied by the tax-deduction Proposal.
